T he move last summer f rom the United States to London prompted mixed emotions. Despite the LSE's reputation as an excellent place to study the social sciences, the UK seemed to lack a certain panache as f ar as policy debates went. Weren't the Brits too civilized f or our American psychodramas of protest, the Tea Party and Occupy? What riled these people up?
On the plus side, I expected that the f uror about health care costs in the UK to be below the perennial f ever pitch that it is in the US, where health care accounts f or about 18% of GDP. In Britain, health care spending only stands at a comparatively modest 10% of GDP. I looked f orward to studying the subject in a monastic environment, where the spectre of "death panels" didn't loom like the Sword of Damocles.
I quickly learned f rom the f ront pages of The Guardian and The Times that the NHS is actually quite contentious indeed. Although we Americans spend f ar and away the most money per capita on health care, the rate of increase in health care costs is just as high in European countries and Japan.
T his seemingly unstoppable rise has prompted many people to theorize on the why of the situation. Some blame the spiralling costs on unnecessary care or physician salaries; others on a lack of market discipline due to insurance, or a culture of "def ensive medicine" f ostered by rapacious personal injury lawyers. All these contribute to health care costs, but they are marginal f actors, and of ten provide no explanation at all on why costs keep increasing as a percent of GDP -that is, consistently increasing f aster than everything else we buy.
Cue William Baumol, an American economist whose deliciously f ascinating book, The Cost Disease, should be required reading f or (and I'm aware of the boldness of this claim) all policymakers in the world. Baumol proposed the "Cost Disease" theory in 1966, f inally christening it with a book of the same name f orty six years later. T he idea goes something like this: productivity is increasing in all sectors of the economy, so it takes less time/labor/money to make things. But in some industries, like manuf acturing and computing, productivity has increased much f aster than in service industries, like health care and education, where the product is "customized" and theref ore has an irreducible labor component. Cars can be made by robots, since they are almost completely standardized. However, robots cannot yet perf orm neurosurgery.
T his is straightf orward, but the implications are enormous. Since the slow productivity-improving sectors (what Baumol ref ers to as the "stagnant sectors") improve slower than others, they of course make up a larger percentage of what we spend money on. Even if health care accounts f or 60% of GDP in 2105 (more on this below), that's f ine, because that 40% which buys things f rom the f ast-improving sector (the "progressive sector") will be able to buy a ton of those things, since they've become so much cheaper. Even if health care took up 60% of GDP, it wouldn't bankrupt us. We will always be able to af f ord it.
T his might seem like a sunny conclusion -the apocalypse is not nigh. But according to Baumol, there is still a signif icant danger: policymakers think that the apocalypse is indeed nigh. As experiences in the US and the UK attest, politicians of ten take drastic measures to cut health care costs, when in reality, costs don't necessarily need cutting. Ideally, policymakers would realize that costs are increasing naturally. In trying to solve a problem that's not a problem, they actually create a problem.
Distributing health care equitably while costs continue to grow is still a major challenge. One of the main lessons f rom "T he Cost Disease" is that since we can and always will af f ord health care, making sure we have robust income transf er mechanisms in place to help the less f ortunate is correspondingly important. T his is because despite the f act that the cost disease ensures that we as a society will be able to af f ord more heatlh care, it does not necessarily mean that it will be distributed equitably. Instead of trying to slow the growth of NHS spending in the UK or Medicare in the US, we should be making sure redistribution to poor/ill people is more robust.
Perhaps the best thing about Baumol's book is that it is concise, a rare achievement f or a social scientist, a subpopulation that tends to believe its ideas deserve War-and-Peace length tomes. For example, Baumol only spends a f ew pages discussing how the advances in the "progressive sector" are more dangerous that rising prices in the stagnant sector. When prices f all in areas like weapons manuf acturing and individuals gain ever greater power to cause mass destruction, Baumol contests that the f ate of humanity itself might be threatened. We might kill ourselves with cost savings. Given the magnitude of this assertion, readers might appreciate a more f leshed-out argument f rom Baumol.
Although the brevity is laudable, the book could be even more concise, as the last third could be lef t out altogether. Baumol's discussion of the evidence and implications of the cost disease is superb. T he latter part is a patchwork quilt of essays f rom Baumol and health services researchers about how to improve business processes in health care. T his certainly deserves comment, but it is hardly as inspired as the earlier discussion, and more f itting f or one of the legions of "Enterprise 2.0"-ish books that CEOs seem to enjoy f or some reason.
I have two editorial objections with Baumol's seemingly unshakeable conviction that health care will remain in the stagnant sector as f ar into the f uture as 2105. First, I can promise that by 2105 "health care" as we know it will be radically dif f erent than anything we experience today, and it will probably consist of robots f ixing computer viruses f or other robots on a lunar colony. Once the irreducible labor component is gone, as it certainly might be in 2105, health care could reap the productivity gains of the progressive sector. Second, while Baumol's disease certainly contributes greatly to rising health care costs, he spends very little talking about how much of the increase it explains. Most health economists accept as gospel the f act that f ast dif f usion of new medical technology is the real cause of increasing costs. Since Baumol takes a somewhat contrarian approach, a discussion of how his theory merits a reconsideration of the conventional wisdom is warranted, but it is unf ortunately lacking.
Despite the f act that The Cost Disease runs out of steam at the end, the f irst two-thirds are absolutely excellent. Baumol's interpretation of rising health care costs is compelling, and it is a perspective so rarely heard that every attempt should be made to f oist it into the broader dialogue of policymakers, economists, and the public, where it can be analyzed and assessed. As Baumol implies, the real disease lies in our dialogue, not in health care costs.
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